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The Art of Aidagara: Ethics,
Aesthetics, and the Quest for an
Ontology of Social Existence in
Watsuji Tetsuro¯’s Rinrigaku
James M. Shields
This paper provides an analysis of the key term aidagara (‘betweenness’) in the
philosophical ethics of Watsuji Tetsuro¯ (1889–1960), in response to and in light
of the recent movement in Japanese Buddhist studies known as ‘Critical Buddhism’.
The Critical Buddhist call for a turn away from ‘topical’ or intuitionist thinking and
towards (properly Buddhist) ‘critical’ thinking, while problematic in its bipolarity, raises
the important issue of the place of ‘reason’ vs ‘intuition’ in Japanese Buddhist ethics.
In this paper, a comparison of Watsuji’s ‘ontological quest’ with that of Martin
Heidegger (1889–1976), Watsuji’s primary Western source and foil, is followed by an
evaluation of a corresponding search for an ‘ontology of social existence’ undertaken by
Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962). Ultimately, the philosophico-religious writings of Watsuji
Tetsuro¯ allow for the ‘return’ of aesthesis as a modality of social being that is truly
dimensionalized, and thus falls prey neither to the verticality of topicalism nor the
limiting objectivity of criticalism.
Watsuji Tetsuro¯ is so well known as the leading ethicist of modern Japan that his
concern for the arts and aesthetics is usually somewhat neglected. Yet these
concerns not only constitute a large part of his writing but also provide a vantage
point for looking at Watsuji’s notion of emptiness. (LaFleur, 1978, p. 245)
As long as man . . . is merely a passive recipient of the world of sense, i.e. does no
more than feel, he is still completely One with that world; and just because he is
himself nothing but world; there exists for him as yet no world. Only when, at the
aesthetic stage, he puts it outside himself, or contemplates it, does his personality
differentiate itself from it, and a world becomes manifest to him because he has
ceased to be One with it. (Schiller, 1982, xxv.1)
In the early 1990s, a polemical scholarly movement known as Critical Buddhism sent
shock-waves through the hitherto calm world of Japanese Buddhist scholarship.
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Attacking doctrines, entire sects, philosophers and philosophical schools, the
Critical Buddhists—under the de facto leadership of Hakamaya Noriaki and
Matsumoto Shiro¯—instigated a veritable cottage-industry for the ‘reappraisal’ of
Japanese Buddhist ways, especially in terms of ethics (see Hakamaya, 1989, 1990;
Matsumoto, 1989, 1993).1 More specifically, the succeeding debates have prompted
further investigation into: (a) the connection between specific religious doctrines,
principles, values and the actual effects of these in terms of history and politics,
and; (b) the even more vexed question of locating and identifying the ‘essence’ of
a particular religion or faith tradition.
Critical Buddhists contrast the essence of ‘true’ Buddhism with the historical/
ethical/political effects of the religion as it has been practiced, such that (ethical-
political) judgments of the latter spur and complement a critical re-evaluation of the
former. So-called hongaku or ‘topical’ thinking is the beˆte noir of this re-evaluation:
The basic weakness of hongaku thought according to the Critical Buddhists is that
ontologically it does not allow for the existence of an Other, since all things are
considered to arise from the single, undifferentiated primordial dha¯tu or locus,
and that it is thus rendered epistemologically and ethically incapable of dealing
with the complex manifestations of otherness that form concrete ethical choices.
(Heine, 1997, pp. 256–257)
Thus, Critical Buddhism locates the weakness of (particularly East Asian Maha¯ya¯na)
Buddhist practice in the prevailing motifs which emphasize non-differentiation,
union and harmony—topos—while downplaying reason, criticism and language—
critica. An explicit correlation is drawn between the prominence of ‘topical’ doctrines
in Japanese Buddhism and the ethical failings of the nation in the first half of the
20th century.2
A central target of Critical Buddhists is the Kyoto School of Japanese philosophy,
which flourished in the early and mid-20th century under the successive leadership
of Nishida Kitaro¯ (1870–1945), Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) and Nishitani Keiji
(1900–1990). Critical Buddhists assert that the philosophers of the Kyoto School,
in their attempt to bridge the divide of East and West, absorbed the worst of both
traditions, effectively fusing the topos of Zen with the equally topical ‘essentialism’
of the anti-rational/anti-Cartesian stream of Western philosophy, culminating in the
‘phenomenological’ work of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and Martin Heidegger
(1889–1976). Thus the Kyoto School, Critical Buddhists maintain, not only
contributed to the legitimization of wartime ‘emperor-system fascism’, but their
legacy allowed for the eventual resurgence in Japan of ‘topical’ thinkers such as
Giambattista Vico and ultimately for the popularity of ‘postmodern’ theory, with its
concomitant shades of relativism and nihilism.
In their many attacks on Nishida, Nishitani and Tanabe, the Critical Buddhists
rarely mention a fourth figure, who, while peripheral to the Kyoto School, was
influenced by and in turn greatly influenced post-war Japanese thinking, especially
in the field of ethics: Watsuji Tetsuro¯ (1889–1960).3 This essay analyzes the place of
nothingness in the philosophico-religious ethics of Watsuji, and more particularly
the relation between his ethical-ontological principle of aidagara (‘betweenness’),
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Heidegger’s Mit-sein (being-with) and Sorge (Care), and the notion of absolute
mediation developed by Watsuji’s contemporary Tanabe Hajime. It is my contention
that a fuller analysis of Watsujian ‘betweenness’ vis-a`-vis Heidegger and Tanabe
opens an alternative understanding of a Buddhist ontology of relation which goes
beyond the Critical Buddhist dichotomy of critica or topos and thus deepens the
debate surrounding the Kyoto School’s (and Zen’s) ‘forgetting of ethics’.
The Study of ningen sonzai
In Japan, Watsuji proclaims in Rinrigaku, ethics is the study of ningen—human
being.4 The term ningen and the compound ningen sonzai are crucial to Watsuji’s
thesis: Western ethics, he argues, has been unable to come to terms with human
relationships precisely because it conceives of individuals in a atomistic way—in
which any meeting of persons is something of a ‘fall’ from the self-realized unity
or the preservation of unitive individual being. Watsuji notes that, in contrast to
the English term ‘human being’, ningen already implies sociality or relationship.
The Sino-Japanese character nin (or hito) signifies two men supporting each other,
while gen (or aida) implies ‘between’ or ‘among’. Thus Watsuji’s gloss on ningen
is a kind of ontological-ethical credo: ‘men, who are supporting each other, exist
in the world’.5
As an ethical being, that is, a truly human being, one negates individualism by
abandoning one’s (already acquired) independence from others, and by ‘realizing’
(both in the sense of coming to see and making real or actualizing) the mutual
interrelatedness of persons. This, for Watsuji, is the true meaning of ‘selflessness’ and
the true basis of goodness or compassion. In other words, at the very ‘ground’ of
individual being, let us call this for the moment the ‘self’, there exists a primary
‘revolt against’ the association of individuals; a process of inevitable individuation.
If this association is conceived as a ‘negation’ (of the whole), as, indeed, nothing less
than the materialization of absolute negation, then ‘individuation’ is a negation
of absolute negativity (or emptiness). Thus ‘an individual becomes an individual by
negating emptiness . . . as her own fundamental space. This is the self-negation
of absolute negativity’, but this is only part of the process: ‘In addition to that,
an individual must be subordinate to society through emptying herself, regardless
of how this emptying is performed’ (Watsuji, 1996, p. 117).6 Here we see the
complex dialectic or oscillation that exists within human being—a continual to and
fro between the demands of self-expression and the call to sociality. In order to
elucidate the precise meaning of Watsuji’s formulation of the ontological basis
for ethics, it will help to look briefly at his primary Western source and sometimes
foil: Martin Heidegger.
Der Fall des Heideggers: The Limits of Care7
According to Watsuji, Heidegger erred in: (a) his ultimate commitment to the
language and philosophical structures of individualism and consequent neglect of the
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social dimension of human being (or the Mit-sein of Dasein); and (b) his privileging
of time and the temporal over place and spatiality. Let us begin with the first point
of criticism. Here Watsuji diverges from the standard ‘postmodern’ criticism offered
by Derrida and others, namely, that Heidegger was never able to free himself from
the ‘logocentrism’ of Western metaphysics, even as he managed to escape some of its
other pitfalls. For Watsuji, it is not primarily in the pining for Being that Heidegger
goes astray (this is a regrettable but understandable consequence of his rootedness
in Western ontology or onto-theology), but in the very framework of this thought,
where, in Cartesian/Kantian (or perhaps Nietzschean/Kierkegaardian) fashion, the
primary relationship is between the ‘individual’—Dasein—and the non-human
world (whether such is conceived as Nature, Being or God).
Heidegger understood being-in-the-world (in-die-Welt-sein) in terms of the
practical (or ‘ready-to-hand’) use of ‘tools’ and thus, for all his claims to have
overthrown traditional metaphysical subjectivism, grounded his analysis in inescap-
ably subjectivist language. ‘[T]he spatiality inherent in ‘a being there’ is, in the final
analysis, attributed to the relationship of concern between I and tools and has
nothing to do with the relationship of communication among human beings’
(Watsuji, 1996, p. 174). Though tropes of ‘being-with’ (Mit-sein) and Care/Concern
(Sorge) occur quite often in the Heideggerian corpus, these themes, according to
Watsuji, remain relatively underdeveloped, and do not easily connect with
Heidegger’s more general thesis about Being and Time. This point requires some
elaboration. Care—in which the whole structure of Dasein is understood, in its
threefold nature as thrownness, fallenness, and possibility, to be ‘ahead of itself
in already being in the world as being alongside what it encounters in the world’—is
interpreted by Heidegger primarily if not solely in terms of temporality, by way
of anxiety and being-towards-death (Watsuji, 1996, p. 215). Thus Care ultimately
lacks the sense of (embodied) compassion between human beings.
We should note that Watsuji neglects to mention that Heidegger does in fact deal
with ‘place’ and in a quite novel way: in practical concern or Care, Heidegger argues,
distance itself becomes degeometricized and thus space becomes trans-spatial
(e.g. when speaking on the telephone, one’s interlocutor is ‘nearer’ than the person in
the next room, because she is part of one’s immediate ‘world’). Yet Watsuji is correct
(and not the first to note) that this perspective, which would seem to open up the
possibility of Care being manifest in terms of the space of neighborliness, is a path
that Heidegger deigns not to pursue. This may be because, in an obvious debt
to Nietzsche (but also to Jaspers and perhaps even, somewhat ironically, the
Frankfurterschule) Heidegger was intensely, almost obsessively wary of Mass Society
or the Public—das Man (‘Them’). Dasein, after all, cannot be entirely an ‘I am’ if it
also has to be a ‘with-them’.
Thus a non-trivial tension arises between authentic being-with, and inauthentic
being-with-Them. It became clear to Heidegger that one of the lamentable symptoms
of the modern age is precisely that ‘one’s own Dasein dissolves completely into the
kind of being of ‘‘the Others’’ . . .’—thus das Man emburdens authentic being-in-the-
world. Though Care (Sorge) unifies Dasein, even Care must recognize the fallenness
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of man-as-They. For the Frankfurt thinkers and sundry existentialists, this situation
of ‘alienation’ requires nothing less than a (Kierkegaardian) leap into subjectivity,
even if it is a leap without a sure foundation or goal. Heidegger’s Care is not by
any means an ‘ethical’ modality; his use of this term, as with so many others, rids
it of its conventional meaning. For Heidegger, this divestiture or deconstruction is a
necessary step towards rediscovering the true meaning of terms; for others (such as
Pierre Bourdieu) it is an emptying out of meaning with deep and disastrous
implications on the philosophical and political level.
For Watsuji, whatever may be valuable in the Heideggerian trope of Care is lost
in Care’s relentlessly temporal aspect, and in its corresponding abstraction. Care is
not situated in space, or bodies, nor is it ever associated with Others (tarnished
in Heidegger as They). Along the same lines, Watsuji asserts that Heidegger’s
temporality is a purely individualized sort, and ‘fails to materialize in the form
of historicality’—which is the concrete temporality of persons-in-community.8 One’s
thrownness is a burden and the sense of repentance—of coming to terms with one’s
past—is not at all evident in the Heideggerian concept. In attempting to think
Heidegger further, Watsuji contrasts Heidegger’s in-die-Welt-Sein to the Japanese
concepts yononaka and seken—‘the public’—which signify not merely a the spatiality
of human relationships but also the temporality of such.
Moreover, Watsuji raises the problem of the key philosophical term Sein or Being.
Within Western philosophy, Being plays the role of the ‘ground’ of existence and of
logic: it is the ‘A is A’ (Fichte) and the ‘direct, undetermined ‘‘to be’’’ (Hegel)
(Watsuji, 1996, p. 19). However, the grandeur, plenitude, and ‘objectivity’ of Being
limit its applicability in terms of ethics. Western Being must be re-evaluated in terms
more familiar and applicable to the Japanese situation, and to the condition
of sociality more generally. Watsuji suggests that the Japanese term sonzai
(son¼maintenance or subsistence against loss [time]þ zai¼ remaining within
relationships [space]) is a more appropriate term for describing ‘the subjective,
practical, and dynamic structure of human being’ (Watsuji, 1996, p. 21).
Thus, though Heidegger goes beyond the ‘contemplative approach’ to human
existence, which reached an apogee in the ‘transcendental phenomenology’ of his
mentor Husserl, his remarks on ‘concernful dealings’, while opening up spatiality
as the structure of subjective existence, ultimately confines such to the relation
of human beings and tools, and effectively bypasses interpersonal relationships.9
The reader might note a substantial irony here, regarding Heidegger’s professed
intention to escape the bondage of Western metaphysics and its subjectivist/humanist
underpinnings. Indeed, it is precisely the latent or patent anti-humanism in the
Heideggerian corpus (coupled with his infamous silence about his Nazi affiliations
after 1945) that provides the fodder for the prosecutors of his ‘Case’. But this makes
Watsuji’s critique seem odd: how can Heidegger, of all people, be accused of
subjectivism? The answer, I contend, is less difficult than it may initially appear.
Heidegger’s rejection of the metaphysical ‘forgetting of Being’, necessitated a turn
from ‘ontic’ (ontisch) to ‘ontological’ (ontologische) thinking. This move, while
effectively subverting, for instance, the Cartesian and Kantian ego, also subverts the
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community of egos that make up the dominant Western conception of sociality.
While this is, in some ways, a positive ‘deconstructive’ move, Heidegger lacks the
concepts or terms to allow for a rebirth of sociality out of emptiness or betweenness.
In short, ‘man’, in becoming ‘the neighbor of Being’, loses touch with his neighbors
who happen to be mere ‘beings’. For Watsuji, the result is not an overcoming of
nihilism (which the Heideggerian project, in the wake of Nietzsche, claimed to be),
but rather a nihilism in extremis.10
Between Self and Society: Towards Empty Being
The basic principle of Watsujian social ethics can be deduced from these key terms.
What is sought in (ethical) being—sonzai—is the realization of totality through the
individual. Though this, at first glance, seems to fall into the hands of the Critical
Buddhists, who lament the (re)turn to ‘totality’ over rational-critical (and ethical)
discrimination and differentiation, Watsuji insists that this process occurs only
through the ‘negation’ of both the individual and the totality. Above all, it is
imperative to understand that ningen sonzai does not rely upon Being as a source of
existence, but upon Nothingness or Emptiness (ku¯). ‘One can contend that I becomes
aware of itself only through the medium of non-I, by making a detour of nothingness
only on the ground of the subject in which the self and other are not yet disrupted’
(Watsuji, 1996, p. 225).
Thus, in a formula that superficially resembles the Hegelian dialectic, the
individual must first ‘realize’ herself as the ‘other’ over and against the social whole—
this is a crucial stage towards self-awareness. Indeed, ‘[a]part from the self-awareness
of individuals there is no social ethics’. Independent consciousness, like capitalism for
Marx, is not something to be disdained or avoided, but is in fact part and parcel of
ethical ‘self’-realization. The standpoint of independent consciousness—the I—is
‘acquired’ only through a primary disassociation from family, tradition, and society.
‘Just as we are able to abstractively produce an individual’s consciousness of retention
by wiping away all elements of betweenness, so our own selfhood is recognizable
only at the extreme point where all betweenness is eliminated.’ True communality is
possible only through this initial ‘moment’ of independence. However, one must
come to recognize that individuality cannot itself sustain an independent existence,
but is grounded in a negation of the totality: ‘its essence is negation, that is,
emptiness’ (Watsuji, 1996, p. 80).
The other ‘moment’ in the process is one in which the individual ‘surrenders’ to
the totality; Watsuji calls this ‘the demand of the superindividual will’ (Watsuji, 1996,
p. 23). This is another Watsujian phrase that rings ugly to postwar ears and it is
indeed one that has played into the hands of those accusing Watsuji of wartime
collaboration. Whether by this ‘call of the totality’ Watsuji means to imply the
Emperor/State or whether he refers to the transpersonal (or interpersonal) realm
in a more general sense remains something of an open question.11 What is most
significant here is Watsuji’s attempt to situate ethics and ontology in the
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‘betweenness’ of persons, and to understand ‘authenticity’ in terms of the self’s
annihilation, an annihilation which involves not a total disappearance, but the
reconfiguration out of Emptiness: an identification with others in a nondualistic,
but also non-monistic, meeting of self and other.12 Unlike the Hegelian dialectic,
with its sublation (Aufgehoben) of the thesis by the antithesis, in Watsuji we have
a fuller preservation of the terms of the ‘dialectic’—an oscillation rather than a true
synthesis (Carter, 1996, p. 341). The self does not absolutely disappear, nor is it
sublated, nor does it ‘return’ as an original, pure or True Self, but simply is now
‘realized’ as ‘being empty’, or in the words of Tanabe Hajime, ‘empty being’.
Agency and Absolute Criticism
Let us now turn to an analysis of the work of Tanabe Hajime. Despite his one-time
equivalence of the Emperor with the ‘nothingness’ that must undergird democracy,
Tanabe’s focus on the self-as-agent/agency (shutai) over the self-as-contemplative
consciousness (shakun), reflects his Marxist sympathies,13 as well as his general
desire to bring ethics back into the heart of Japanese Buddhism and philosophy.
A prominent conception in postwar Japanese Marxism was the (Sartrean) notion that
the ‘abyss’ of nothingness must underlie the freedom of the acting subject in the
historical world.14 Likewise, Tanabe’s ‘subject’ is first and foremost an agent, a
subject-in-action or in-relation-with-others. Thus Tanabe would concur with
Watsuji’s comment that ‘The study of ethics is the study . . . of the subject as a
practical, active connection’ ( jissenteki ko¯iteki renkan)’ (Koschmann, 1996, p. 103).15
The key terms in Tanabe’s formulation that distinguish his own work from that
of the other major Kyoto School figures Nishida and Nishitani are metanoesis and
absolute mediation. Metanoesis (Jp. zange) ‘entails the painful recollection of one’s
past sins, a feeling of remorse accompanied by the strong wish that these sins had
not been committed’ (Heisig, 1986, p. xliii). Crucial to Tanabe’s thesis is the fact that
the meta of meta-noetics implies that such ultimately ‘surpasses the position of mere
contemplation (noesis)’ (Takeuchi, cited in Heisig, 1986, p. xlv). Yet what must also
be noted is precisely the ‘after’ aspect of meta-noesis, which is not meant to be anti-
rational or irrational, i.e. not an erasure or sublation of reason, logic, language,
or criticism,16 but a way of pushing the critique of reason to its limits, a task, in
Tanabe’s eyes, begun but left incomplete by Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard. In fact,
Tanabe goes so far as to call his logic of metanoetics ‘absolute criticism’ (Heisig,
1986, p. lv).
Absolute criticism is simply the existential involvement of the subject involved
in the critical task, such that, faced with the ‘crisis of its own dilemma’, the subject
‘surrenders’ to its own self-criticism. This is not expressed by Tanabe in terms
of the self’s dissolution, but rather as the ‘breaking-through (Durchbruch) of a self
that hitherto had moved exclusively within the realms of discursive thinking and
reflection’ (Tanabe, 1986, p. 4). Moreover, this is the point at which ‘absolute
mediation’ becomes involved: the ‘truth’ of the absolute can only ‘function’ in its
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relative mediation with the world of forms and relative beings.17 ‘In this sense,
the transformation through vertical mediation between the absolute and the self
(Thou and I) must also be realized in horizontal social relationships between my self
and other selves (I and Thou)’ (Tanabe, 1986, p. lviii). In other words, absolute
mediation takes the form of mediation through other beings; ‘the effect of the
absolute on the relative only becomes real as the effect of the relative on the relative’
(Tanabe, 1986, p. 19, my emphasis).
Here we see an obvious parallel with Watsuji’s aidagara as the ground for ethics
and human being. Nothingness does not appear in itself ‘but only through its real
channel which is historical being . . .. What determines the individual is always species
as an historical, relative particular form of being. It is not some absolute negativity
of nothingness apart from the movement of this relative negativity’ (Koschmann,
1996, p. 118).18
Absolute mediation takes place only through the irruption of absolute nothingness
into relative being. In other words,
[b]eing here is ‘being as upa¯ya,’ [ho¯bentiki-sonzai] that is, being as a mediator
of nothingness. Moreover, human existential self-awareness, which realizes the
compassion and altruism of the bodhisattva through the equality of mutual
transformation, must be a mediation of nothingness in the sense of just such a
transformation of subjectivity. (Tanabe, 1986, p. 109)
Thus, Tanabe concludes, metanoetics—and only metanoetics—is able to overcome,
on the one hand, the problems of individualism that beset Western conceptions
of freedom and, on the other, the lack of individual agency/ethics/this-worldliness
of which Buddhism, and Zen in particular, is often (with some justification) accused.
Tanabe’s emphasis on the necessary ‘return to the world’ (genso¯) which
accompanies the ‘movement towards the absolute’ (o¯so¯), is largely directed against
what he feels are the misunderstandings of Zen by ordinary folk (as opposed to
sages). One of Tanabe’s primary (unstated but thinly-disguised) targets is his
ex-mentor Nishida Kitaro¯, in particular Nishida’s concepts of basho/topos and
the ‘absolute identity of self-contradictions’.19 Very much in line with the Critical
Buddhists (but 40 years in advance of them),20 Tanabe takes Nishida to task
for preaching a reliance on the topos of absolute nothingness, as if it were a kind of
abstract universal—‘some space with no specific orientation of direction of any
particular point within it’.21 In short, Nishida-philosophy and, by extension, much
of modern Japanese philosophy, lacks a sense of mediation and (absolute) critique.
Ethics as the ‘Ko¯an of Reality’
As we have seen, ethics (rinri) for Watsuji entails not simply a disciplined reflection
on right or wrong, or on the proper ways of acting in social circumstances, but is
about what it means to be a human in the world; ethics is, to borrow a term from
Heidegger, ‘fundamental ontology’. Within this conception lies not only existential
‘facticity’ but also sociality: being in the world is not just a relation of the ego and the
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world of Being, but a relation between beings. Here etymology comes into play once
again. The Japanese term rin (or nakama) implies ‘fellowship’—‘a body or system
of relations, which a definitive group of persons have with respect to each other,
[which also] signifies individual persons as determined by this system’ (Watsuji,
1996, pp. 10–11). Rin also signifies ‘agreement’ (kimari), ‘form’ (koto), and ‘order
among persons’, while ri signifies ‘reason’. Thus rinri, or ethics, is ‘the order or
pattern through which the communal existence of human beings is rendered
possible’ (Watsuji, 1996, p. 11).
The notion of ‘the betweenness of persons’ (hito to hito to no aidagara) is
fundamental to Watsuji’s ethics and must be examined in greater detail. Despite the
fact that it is always ‘concrete’, betweenness is manifest not simply in the physical
situation of ‘meeting’, but in the ‘dialogue’ that takes place in such a situation.
In Habermasian fashion, dialogue is a form of communicative action, in
which ‘[w]hat I hear is not a succession of sounds, but the koto that expresses
the betweenness of I and Thou. Even though this koto is spoken by Thou by
means of her voice, the koto itself is communally retained between I and Thou’
(Watsuji, 1996, p. 77). Thus meeting is always a meeting of speaking or
communicating beings.
Now we are faced with the task of fleshing out the meaning of different forms or
modes of ‘communication’, and the place of speech in particular. For this we shall
turn again briefly to Tanabe. At one point in Philosophy as Metanoetics, Tanabe
speaks of the Zen ko¯an in terms of understanding that ‘the way of satori is not ethical
in nature but remains at the everyday level’, but he adds that the ‘flaw’ in this
conception of the ko¯an is that ‘history, as objective and common ‘‘social reality’’’,
is bypassed, and thus too is ‘ethical seriousness’. In short, by use of methods like
the ko¯an, Zen neglects ‘the objective historical world whose being should be ‘‘being as
upa¯ya’’’. In contrast, Tanabe suggests that metanoesis ‘views ethics as the ‘‘ko¯an of
reality’’’ and thus ‘metanoetics is philosophy conscious of the foundation of history’
(Tanabe, 1986, p. 131). This requires some reflection. What does it mean to say
that ‘ethics is the ko¯an of reality’? For Tanabe, the ko¯an, while significant for its
shock-value—its dispositional-transfigurative capacity—also must bring one ‘back to
the world’; in the ko¯an words are ‘skillful means’ to provoke satori/conversion.
Thus too, ethics must involve ‘mediation’ by way of ‘skillful means’—actions, words
(and perhaps symbols and myths)—which draw one out of and at the same time
ground one in the world.
However, in what appears to be an attempt to distance his own theories from the
‘aesthetic intuitionism’ of those he criticizes (namely Nishida), Tanabe ultimately
falls back on the notion that ethics must take ‘rational discrimination as its medium’
(Tanabe, 1986, p. 155). ‘[Nishida’s] aesthetic consideration’, he says, ‘does not serve
to overcome the abstraction of intuition but is a mere development and extension of
intuitionism. It neglects the deeper significance of the role of the axis in absolute
transformation’ (Tanabe, 1986, p. 11). It appears that ‘aesthetic’ intuitionism here
implies the sort of contemplation where one is ‘lost’ in the totality,22 without
bothering to ‘return’ to the world of mediated beings. ‘The result is simply an
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intuition similar to artistic creativity and therefore distinct from the faith-in-practice
of Zen’ (Tanabe, 1986, p. 56).
Tanabe’s Anaesthesia
Tanabe’s analysis and self-distancing from the Nishidan ‘aesthetic’ stance
presupposes that aesthesis involves a kind of a priori relationship between a subject
and object, rather than a relationship between beings and ‘objects’ in a community,
one that entails the capacity for change and development. It also assumes that artistic
creativity and ‘aesthetic intuition’ of experience involves only a vertical connection
between mind and form, subject and art-object; and that this integration of
experience will be, ultimately solipsistic and totalizing.23 However, a perspective of
aesthesis may well recognize the significance of mediation with greater perspicuity
than other forms of prehension or awareness, in part because art and beauty are
always already characterized by mediation of the ‘absolute’ in ‘empty forms’, such as
words, symbols or rituals. In short, Tanabe’s (Platonic) rejection of beauty and art—
his anaesthesia—reflects a simplistic understanding of aesthesis, whereby concepts
such as the ‘sublime’24 (where we find a discrimination of non-discrimination,
prompted by an awesome Other-power, and leading to a complete transformation
of—or out of—subjectivity, at its best), or the intersubjective aspect of artistic activity,
are not addressed.
Aidagara and Aesthesis: The Ethics of Sociability
Ultimately, the significance of Watsuji’s work and commitment to aesthetics emerges
most clearly at the level of philosophical anthropology and the attempt to clarify a
‘social ontology of existence’. Watsuji makes explicit reference in his aesthetic
writings to traditional Japanese art forms, such as the tea ceremony (chanoyu) and
linked verse (renga). These are of value precisely because of the particular way in
which they express the interdependence of individuals in creation and artistic
experience.25 Unlike the high Romantic conception of the artist/genius as the solitary
maudit in the manner of Faust or Byron, but very much in line with the ‘classical’
Romantics following Schiller’s (mis)reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgment
(Kant, 1987), Watsuji is concerned to evoke a paradigm of aesthetic ‘play’, which
is at the same time removed from ‘frivolity’ and solipsism, and which is located
in social space.
For all of their debts to Marxism, both Watsuji and Tanabe recognize the serious
flaws in Marxist philosophical anthropology. Watsuji in particular criticizes the
(vulgar Marxist) notion of homo oeconomicus: ‘Human beings (unlike animals) forge
relationships and develop language and consciousness . . . the most basic criterion
of human existence is the formation of relationships between self and others, and
the assumption of a certain attitude as posture in order to accomplish that’ (cited in
Koschmann, 1996, p. 104).26
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In order to nuance this vision of human nature, Watsuji turned to the writings
of various doyens of late 19th-century and early 20th-century social theory:
Gumplowicz, Durkheim, Scheler, Tarde, Wiese and Simmel. However, being
ultimately convinced that these thinkers (like Heidegger after them) were unable
to rid themselves of commitment to an atomistic (and Judeo-Christian)
philosophical anthropology, Watsuji missed a central theme to the work of Georg
Simmel (1858–1918)—one that appears to have relevance to his own philosophico-
religious ethics: sociability. In The Sociology of Sociability (1949), Simmel defines
this term as the social counterpart of play as well as of art. Just as play and art ‘draw
their form from . . . realities but leave . . . reality behind them’, sociability ‘makes up
its substance from numerous fundamental forms of serious relationship among
men, a substance, however, spared the frictional realities of real life’. Sociability
so conceived, as the ‘sociological play-form,’ is beyond utility—it is an end in
itself. ‘[S]ociability distils . . . out of the realities of social life the pure essence of
association, of the associative process as a value and a satisfaction’ (cited in
Koschmann, 1996, p. 187).
This concept has deep roots within the Kantian-Romantic tradition and especially
in the writings of Friedrich Schiller, who, in The Aesthetic Education of Man (1801),
attempted to work out the implications and possibilities of an ‘aesthetic’ approach to
‘enlightenment’. The very meaning of the term ‘aesthetic’ was extended by Schiller;
no longer tied to works of art and their creation or reception, aesthesis applied to
any thing—or person—that could be conceived as ‘living form’ (or perhaps, being-
in-the-world); moreover, the appreciation or awareness of living form implies a
modality of the entire being—a metanoesis that is itself aesthesis (Schiller, 1982,
p. 101). The play concept is foundational in Schiller’s work, not only for art but
for ‘the much more difficult art of living’ and his examples are drawn from life,
especially the life of human relationship (being-with; caring-for). Play is conceived by
Schiller as the ‘third drive’ which will reconcile the other fundamental drives: towards
change (senses) and towards changelessness or order (reason). Rather than annulling
or sublating these two, the play drive is a kind of ‘reciprocal subordination’ of or
oscillation between them. ‘The play-drive, therefore, would be directed towards
annulling time within time, reconciling becoming with absolute being and change
with identity . . . [it] will endeavour so to receive as if it had itself brought forth and
to bring forth as the intuitive sense aspires to receive’ (Schiller, 1982, xiv, pp. 3–4).
Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby suggest that, in this light, ‘it would
not . . . be at all inapt to compare [Schiller’s] ‘‘third drive’’ . . . to, say, the opening
of the ‘‘Third Eye’’ in Zen Buddhism’ (Schiller, 1982, p. xcvi).
The Schillerian–Simmelian notion of the sociability-aesthesis of ‘play’ has especial
relevance in the linguistic realm: when conceived expressively rather than simply
designatively language has as one of its ‘functions’ the building of relationship, or
association. Sociability arises not simply from mute ‘play’—but primarily from
‘dialogue’. Yet it is not simply ‘critical’ speaking, it is speaking that rests on a
particular ‘field’ of relationship, and which ‘deepens’ that field in its very being.
As Simmel puts it: ‘Sociability provides . . . an artificial space in which both objective
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interests and personal egos are suspended, and each participant acts ‘‘as if’’ all were
equal, and ‘‘as though he especially esteemed everyone’’’ (cited in Koschmann, 1996,
p. 187).27 Human relationship, the ground and locus for ethics, is ‘empty’ of
substance, unreal—aesthetic.
Conclusion: ku¯ ga ku¯ zoru
The above discussion of the place of aesthesis and the ontology of sociability leads
ultimately to reflection upon the meaning of the Zen maxim regarding the ‘emptiness
of emptiness’ (Jp. ku¯ ga ku¯ zoru/Skt. s´u¯nya¯ta s´u¯nya¯ta). This apothegm can be
interpreted in a number of ways. Abe Masao (1975, pp. 187–188) reads it as
indicating that ‘true Emptiness is wondrous Being, absolute u, fullness and suchness
of everything, tatha¯gata, ultimate reality’. Abe’s paean to the plenitude of vacuity,
while not invalid, must be dimensionalized somewhat by another reading of s´u¯nya¯ta
s´u¯nya¯ta, whereby what is implied is the emptiness of the realization of emptiness
itself. In short, emptiness upheld (realized) as a doctrine or an element of cognition
must be further real-ized in the ‘experience’ of emptiness in the physical/phenomenal
world.28 Moreover, this ‘experience’ is not beyond language or conception, though
it may not be exhausted by these modes of ‘revelation’. Here ‘true’ emptiness is the
oscillation/mediation of nothingness-being, concretized, made real, in the aesthesis-
aidagara of beings-in-the-world. In order for Compassion/Care to be more than
an empty abstraction, mediation is necessary, and mediation implies a horizontality
to the relationship of beings or living forms. Thus the horizontal aspect of s´u¯nya¯ta
s´u¯nya¯ta runs against the strictly vertical tendency of o¯so¯-centrism/topos, without
sliding into the anaesthetic temptations of the Cartesian (or Critical Buddhist)
‘topophobia’.
The difference rests in the horizontal nature (or rather three-dimensional nature)
of the active relationship, as opposed to the two-dimensional nature of the merely
contemplative/intuitive one. Perhaps this is a ‘third aperture’—an aesthetic-ethical
one grounded in the absolute nothingness of mediated betweenness, rather than the
immediate basho of Self—conceived as an experience of gen/ma which draws ku¯ back
onto itself.29 Here ‘disinterestedness’ (Seinlassen) does not imply passivity, contem-
plative serenity, or an intuitionist/topical merger of subject–object but rather a kind
of (critical, non-instrumental) distancing that still upholds the fundamental
betweenness of living forms in intersubjective space (O¨ffentlichkeit); one that refuses
the tendency of emptiness or nothingness to collapse upon itself.
As Watsuji (1996) concludes: ‘Society can arise only between one subject and
another in and through practical communication and, hence, through dialogue,
communication, and transportation’ (pp. 161–162). In short, ethics does not
require Cartesian, Hobbesian or Kantian ‘individuals’ acting out of self-autonomy,
but that does not mean it can do away with linguistic/symbolic discrimination,
distinction, differentiation in toto. Meditation—thinking-through or after-thinking
(denkt-nach)—finds its home in the mediation of Nothingness by way of words,
symbols and (primarily) the concrete ‘emptiness’ of other beings.
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In this paper, by utilizing the most important philosophico-religious tropes
of Watsuji Tetsuro¯ vis-a`-vis some key concepts of Martin Heidegger and Tanabe
Hajime, I have drawn out the ethical implications of various conceptions of
‘fundamental ontology’. Critical Buddhists insist that Nishida, Nishitani and Tanabe
(and one could say, by extension, Watsuji) are complicit in the devastation wrought
by Japan on its own and other peoples during the first half of this century.
This critique is primarily an ethical one, driven by considerations of the
Wirkungsgeschichte of Kyoto tropes like the logic of place, absolute self-identity of
contradictions, absolute mediation and metanoetics. The ‘ethical’ critique, however,
ultimately hinges on a particular understanding of the use of language and the
meaning of mediation, expounded in the Critical Buddhist exaltation of critica
over topos. In developing the concept of aesthesis out of Watsujian ethical theory,
I have suggested an alternative vantage-point from which to understand Kyoto
School—and perhaps Zen—‘ethics’ more generally.
Notes
[1] See, for instance, the papers by Heine, Hubbard, Sueki and Swanson in Pruning the Bodhi
Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism (Hubbard & Swanson, 1997), the papers by Heisig,
Ives, Maraldo and Van Bragt in Rude Awakenings: Nationalism, Zen, and the Kyoto School
(Heisig & Maraldo, 1994), Brian Victoria’s Zen at War (1997), as well as Iris Chang’s Rape of
Nanking (1997), and Patrick Smith’s Japan: A Reinterpretation (1997).
[2] For a more extensive analysis and critique of the Critical Buddhist understanding of the
nature of Buddhism as ‘criticism’, see ‘Hihan Bukkyo¯: Critical Buddhism as a Hermeneutics
of Practice’ (Shields, 2006).
[3] Carter (1996) concurs with LaFleur (1978), in remarking that, ‘[e]ven though Watsuji
was certainly never a member of the ‘‘inner circle’’ of that school . . . the influence of that
developing tradition on Watsuji is evident’ (p. 338). A true polymath, Watsuji published
monographs on Nietzsche (1913) and Kierkegaard (1915)—for which he was credited with
introducing existentialism to Japan—Japanese art and literature (1920), Dogen and the
Japanese spirit (1926a), primitive Christianity (1926b), primitive Buddhism (1927),
Confucius (1938) and Greek culture (1946). The study of ethics was a somewhat late
concern, though very much indebted to his earlier religious, historical, aesthetic and cross-
cultural investigations. Regarding the debate between William LaFleur and David Dilworth
(1974); pace Carter, who sees them in a ‘dialectical tension’, it seems to me that LaFleur
is closer to the mark in reading Watsuji in a ‘religious’ fashion. Certainly, I think Dilworth
(1974, p. 17) is mistaken is de-Buddhizing Watsuji. Though Confucian elements are evident
in his work, I agree with LaFleur (and Watsuji himself) in seeing Buddhism as the
prominent influence in Watsujian thought, especially by the time of Rinrigaku. Carter (1996,
pp. 347–349), in similar fashion to Dilworth, speaks of Watsuji taking Nishida in
‘a horizontal direction’, implying that he diverges from the ‘Buddhist’ path of absolute
nothingness by going ‘epistemological’—again, a dichotomy (indebted to a Nishidan-
existentialist privileging of pure experience over conceptual thinking and discrimination)
that is, to me, facile and unnecessary.
[4] The complete title of Rinrigaku is Ningen no gaku to shite no rinrigaku.
[5] ‘The human being is ‘the group’ (yo no naka) and also the ‘person’ (hito) in the group.
The human being is, therefore, not only the ‘person’ nor simply ‘society’ (shakai). Here we
can see the dual quality of the human being’s dialectical unity’ (cited in Koschmann,
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1996, p. 102). Watsuji’s reliance upon root meanings and etymology (figura etymologica) is a
trait familiar to students of Heidegger, and one that has been, it must be said, widely
criticized as a somewhat malleable hermeneutic tool.
[6] Watsuji’s last phrase may, and perhaps should, give us pause. What does he mean by
‘regardless of how this emptying is performed’? Watsuji goes on in this passage to conclude
that human association so conceived is understood to be ‘the movement of the negation
of negation in which absolute negativity returns to itself through its own self-negation’;
and that, moreover, this picture includes human association as ‘coercion’ (1996, p. 117).
Thus the ‘continuous creation of human beings’ that is ‘the basic principle of ethics’ must be
taken not simply as the biblical ‘good creation’ of more life but also as the ‘bad creation’
of the Orwellian or Huxleyan sort. See note 11.
[7] Watsuji traveled in Germany and Europe in 1927, and, like his countrymen Nishitani and
Tanabe, came into immediate contact with the work and person of Martin Heidegger. The
young Heidegger had recently become the doyen of German phenomenological thinking,
usurping the mantle of his mentor Husserl. Upon returning to Japan, Watsuji penned Fu¯do
(Climate and Culture) as a direct response to Heidegger’s just-published Sein und Zeit
(see Watsuji, 1971; Heidegger, 1996). Though ultimately critical of Heidegger’s philosophy,
Watsuji’s considered response indicates that he—as with many other modern Japanese
scholars—believed the German thinker’s work to be of epoch-making importance and
potentially a bridge over the Great East–West Divide.
[8] ‘What is the field in which two Dasein coexist? This field must also belong to the basic
structure of sonzai’ (Watsuji, 1996, p. 221).
[9] This limited sense of spatiality is the reason, Watsuji (1996) claims, that Heidegger
considered temporality to be of greater importance than spatiality (p. 175). But see Yuasa’s
(1996) comments on Heidegger’s later Kehre as ‘a turn from temporal life to spatial life’
(p. 336), and also Sakai’s (1991) critique of Watsuji on Heidegger, where Sakai wonders
what form of individualism Heidegger is culpable of—surely, he says, not the classical
substantialist or Cartesian sort. This point is well-taken, but I am inclined to agree with
Le´vinas (1994), Werner Marx (1992), Dilworth (1974), Steiner (1991) and others who argue
that Heidegger was never able to extend his concern with ‘concern’ in a meaningful ethical
way, and that this lacuna reflects a latent ‘subjectivism’ in his work.
[10] See Steiner’s (1991) remarks on the reading (by Rudolf Carnap, among others) of
Heidegger’s ‘play with and on Nothingness’ as a path leading to nihilism rather than out
of it (p. 154). The precise differences between Heideggerian and Buddhist/Kyoto School
understandings of nothingness bears further work, however it is clear that Heidegger was not
working with a sense of s´u¯nya¯ta. We might also note, in this regard, the abyssal Liebestod
that colours the darker side of German Romanticism (and crops up in Oswald Spengler’s
Decline of the West [1918], a work with which the young Heidegger was quite familiar).
[11] Bellah (1965), Sakai (1991), and Dilworth (2006) are the harshest critics of Der Fall des
Watsujis, but even the more moderate Pincus (1991) and Odin (1992, 1996) acknowledge
the strong connection between Watsuji’s writings and ‘totalitarian state ethics’ (if not
‘emperor system fascism’). Like Tanabe, Watsuji’s biggest failing in this regard is his onetime
equivalence of the Emperor as the locus of absolute nothingness, and thus the ‘ground’ and
focus of individual and social existence. Watsuji is most culpable in his wartime writings,
especially ‘The Way of the Subject’ and ‘America’s National Character’, which reek of
propaganda and racial stereotyping. Is this another instance of the Case of Heidegger, where
a weak-willed man lets his ideas copulate with state ideology partly out of self-interest and
partly out of a desire to give his ideas concrete form? More pressingly, is there a necessary or
inevitable link between the philosophy/‘ethics’ of Japanese imperial ideology and Watsuji’s
ethics of betweenness? I say, provisionally at least, no. Watsuji’s theory of personhood,
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as outlined in the Rinrigaku (admittedly extirpated by the author himself after the War of its
more Imperialist notions), is clearly meant to restore a Buddhist ‘middle way’ (Jp. chu¯do¯)
between extreme positions of essentialism on the one side and nihilism on the other; and
between rampant individualism of the Bacon–Hobbes sort and the type of social organicism,
which typifies fascist ideology. Though the odor lingers, and cannot be easily wished away,
it should not render the life work of such a seminal thinker anathema.
[12] Watsuji’s remarks here bear remarkable similarity to the work of: (1) Emmanuel Le´vinas
(1906–1995) a student of Heidegger who was also concerned with the lack of an
interpersonal (and thus ethical) dimension in the Heideggerian corpus (and in
phenomenology more generally); and (2) Ju¨rgen Habermas, whose thesis of ‘communicative
action’ or ‘discourse ethics’ sustains the notion of an interpersonal self (Habermas, 1990).
I intend to explore these specific connections and their implications for interreligious
dialgue in future research.
[13] Tanabe, like Nishitani and Watsuji, studied in Germany in the early 1920s, and, as with these
two, was highly influenced by the work of Husserl and Heidegger. In 1928 he succeeded to
Nishida’s chair in philosophy at Kyoto University, a post he held through the war. Always
fascinated with Hegel, he fell under the influence of the young Marxist thinkers of the period
(e.g. Miki Kiyoshi [1897–1945]; Tosaka Jun [1900–1945]).
[14] See Umemoto (1947). Despite superficial similarities, Tanabe’s subject ultimately diverges
from the Sartrean–Marxist subject, largely because of his Kyoto School/Buddhist roots,
where nothingness cannot be left as nihility or negativity, some sort of existential ‘abyss’, but
must be understood in terms of absolute nothingness, or ku¯ (s´u¯nya¯ta).
[15] It must be noted, however, that Tanabe’s acting-subject acts out of a voluntary submission
to the call or prompting of the Other-power. His is ultimately a philosophico-religious
vision of tariki. In other words, the self acts while being acted upon, and this effects
a ‘conversion from negation to affirmation, from [being-toward] death to [being-toward]
life’ (Heisig, 1986, p. xliv).
[16] It is noteworthy that Tanabe’s own metanoesis or conversion emerged in the context of
Japan’s impending defeat, and his own sense of powerlessness and lack of freedom, viz. the
military regime’s rightist jingoism. Thus, rather than metanoesis being a turn away from
the world to silence or contemplation of the absolute, it is, at least for Tanabe himself,
a response to a lack of self-expression, dialogue, and criticism. Metanoesis can thus be
conceived in terms of a bulwark against irrationalism, as much as against the excesses of
reason and conceptualization.
[17] This correlates with Streng’s (1967) thesis that ‘Na¯ga¯rjuna presumes no ‘absolute’ in
relation to a ‘particular’ but empty structures of particulars’ (p. 151). Richards (1978)
concurs.
[18] Tanabe adds: ‘This is the point of contact between the philosophy of nothingness and
Marxism’ (cited in Koschmann, 1996, p. 118). Of course, both Nishida and Nishitani had
also insisted that their nothingness was not ‘absolute negativity’ but rather the plenitude
of ‘emptiness’ which is at the ‘ground’ (or ‘field’) of such negativity, but Tanabe’s
‘historicalization’ of the philosophy of nothingness bespeaks a markedly different approach
to the problem and one that might go some way in answering our concerns regarding
the ‘lack of history’ in the work of the Kyoto School thinkers (see e.g. Gilkey, 1989, p. 68;
Heisig, 1986, p. xx; D.T. Suzuki, cited in Heisig, 1994, p. 20).
[19] These, according Tanabe (1986), imply a ‘non-discrimination of discrimination’
(mufunbetsu no funbetsu) that is in fact very far from the ‘logic of Zen’, which is best
exemplified in the reverse formulation: the ‘discrimination of nondiscrimination’ (p. 56).
In the former, the emphasis is on the epistemological primacy of nondiscrimination,
and thus a logic of both/and, rather than neither/nor.
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[20] Tanabe’s remarks are often remarkably prescient of Critical Buddhism: ‘There is no question
but that the in-itself tendency of Zen Buddhism runs the risk of falling prey to unmediated
self-identity. For the fact is, the principle of ‘Above all else, the Great Death!’ often
degenerates into a mere national slogan, and religious action fails to me mediated by the
rational seriousness of ethics, lacking the mediation either of the powerlessness of the self
that is awakened in the confrontation with ethics, or of the radical evil that is hidden in the
depths of the self’ (Tanabe, 1986, p. 171). Of course, to this the Critical Buddhist response
might be: Physician, heal thyself!
[21] ‘Since absolute nothingness is always a transformation and a mediation, it can never exist
immediately’ (Tanabe, 1986, p. 82). Compare Aristotle’s frustration with Plato’s abstract
‘forms’ (Ethics I.vi) and also, within classical Indian thought, Ra¯ma¯nuja’s response
to S´ankara’s non-dualism, in which, for Ra¯ma¯nuja, the inseparability of human and
God/Other-power is not conceived as absolute identity, but the latter retains hegemony,
and the former must respond in absolute faith and love.
[22] Elsewhere, Tanabe (1986) criticizes both the Zen sage and the Daoist hermit for advancing
no further than ‘aesthetic enjoyment . . . despite their best efforts to transcend the ethical,
[they] can only end up in a state of nature that is in fact sub-ethical’ (p. 171). Tanabe is very
much concerned with upholding the Kierkegaardian ‘paradoxical’ (or oscillating) dialectic
over the Hegelian synthesizing/sublating one. His critique of Nishida is also extended onto
Schelling and Bo¨hme, whose Ungrund differs from Nothingness is being (1) unmediated
and (2) allied with a principle of nondifferentiation (pp. 141–143). Also see Faure (1991) for
a critique of the ‘rhetoric of immediacy’ in Chan/Zen Buddhism.
[23] Tanabe (1986) mentions his debt to Plato (whom he prefers to Plotinus), suggesting that
he ‘shall adhere to a standpoint of the self-consciousness of action-faith that follows Plato
in proscribing aesthetic contemplation’, even while criticizing many other aspects of Plato’s
work as insufficiently ‘concrete’ (p. 89). Also see Tanabe (1986, p. 264), where he associates
aesthetic enjoyment with ‘pleasure’, hedonism and elitism.
[24] The ‘positing-awareness’ (‘beautiful’) and ‘dispositioning-shock’ (‘sublime’) aspects of
aesthesis find theoretical expression within the Japanese aesthetic tradition in the distinction
between sabi and wabi (see Inada, 1997, p. 126). Aesthesis (Gk. &, a perceiving)
denotes ‘the perception of the external world by the senses’. The derivation ‘aesthetic’ was
first understood as ‘things perceptible by the senses, things material’ but, by virtue of
Baumgarten’s appropriation in his Aesthetica (1750) the term came to imply matters of taste
and beauty. This ‘misuse’ was protested by, among others, Kant, who insisted that
aesthetics refer solely to ‘the science which treats of the conditions of sensuous perception’
(Critique of Pure Reason I.I.x1). However, Kant himself, in the Critique of Judgment (1790),
effectively collapsed both senses into one. Thus aesthesis came to signify creative activity
(non-teleological, and non-cognitive) as well as a kind of discriminating awareness (of the
perceptive, that is, material and corporeal sort). It is also well to note that one of the roots
of aesthesis is thesis/thetic ("–o&), which implies ‘placement’, or ‘position’, and derives
from the Indo-European root de-, which gave birth to both ‘theory’ and ‘do’. Thus aes-thetic
activity involves a dis-position in the way that Tanabe’s meta-noesis involves an after-
thinking.
[25] The character gen (pronounced ma when understood as an artistic/spiritual ideal) is a key
term in Japanese aesthetics, signifying ‘betweenness’). Compare Mead (1964, p. 299), on the
nature of aesthetic/creative experience, which ‘belongs to coordinated efforts of man,
when the role of the other in the production is aroused in each worker at the common task,
when the sense of team play, esprit de corps, inspires interrelated activities’.
[26] Besides the direct influence of Natsume So¯seki, other currents of thinking about aesthetics
in Japan in the early 20th century no doubt had an effect on Watsuji’s thinking.
One important and influential thinker was Kuki Shuzo (1888–1941), who studied
with Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Bergson, and whose best known work Iki no ko¯zo¯
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(The Structure of Edo Aesthetic Style, 1930), focused on the sense of style and deportment
prevalent, especially among the younger generation, in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji
eras (see Kuki, 1997). This style (iki) was characterized by a ‘playful bravado’ which
expressed the growing autonomy of a mercantile and artisanal class vs the asceticism and
martialism of the samurai bureaucracy (Pincus, 1991, p. 148). Kuki upholds iki style as an
essentially Japanese creation—balancing bitai (erotic allure), ikuji (fearless pride) and
akirame (‘Buddhist’ resignation)—and one that must be used as a bulwark against Western
cultural imperialism. In short, the secret of iki style is ‘to continuously decrease the distance
[between oneself and another/object] while never allowing that distance to be completely
annihilated’ (p. 147).
[27] The ‘fictiveness of sociability’ has not gone unnoticed in Japanese philosophy. Fukuzawa
borrows this aspect of Simmelian theory, thereby, in the words of Moriyama, ‘pushing
the logic of humanism to its furthest extreme’ (cited in Koschmann, 1996, p. 186). Also see
Nishitani (1990, pp. 252–255, 258–259), on ‘play’.
[28] Glyn Richards (1978), citing Streng’s (1967) interpretation of Na¯ga¯rjuna, asks whether
it might be that ‘the meaning of s´u¯nya¯ta ultimately has to be sought in its use in a form
of life rather than in any attempt to locate an objective referent or counterpart?’ (p. 260)
It seems clear to me that this is indeed so.
[29] ‘The religioaesthetic principle of ma can be translated not only as betweenness and
relatedness, but also as interval, gap, blank, pause, opening, void and a variety of other
things indicating the ethereal beauty which is manifested by the empty space and/or time
‘‘in between’’ all persons and events’ (Odin, 1992, p. 482). Watsuji adds: ‘This is the ecstasy
of art and at the same time an ecstasy expressive of what is called ‘‘self-and-other/not-two’’
( jita funi). Thus it is a religious ecstasy of the great emptiness’ (cited in LaFleur,
1978, p. 249).
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